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New York

*President:* Mr. Al-Nasser ..... (Qatar)

*In the absence of the President, Ms. Kamara (Liberia), Vice-President, took the Chair.*

*The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m.*

**Agenda item 86** *(continued)*

**Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency**

**Note by the Secretary-General (A/66/95)**

**Draft resolution (A/66/L.6)**

**The Acting President**: Members will recall that the Assembly considered item 86 at its 46th plenary meeting on 1 November. We shall now hear the remaining speakers.

**Mr. Shin Dong Ik** (Republic of Korea): At the outset, allow me to thank Director General Yukiya Amano for presenting the 2010 annual report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (see A/66/95) and for his statement (see A/66/PV.46), which provides additional information on the past year's developments in the Agency's activities. I would also like to express our appreciation to the Director General and to the secretariat of the IAEA for their dedication and professionalism in carrying out the statutory mandates of the IAEA.

The IAEA plays a vital role in accelerating and enlarging the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. Those mandates are subject to ever-increasing demands and new challenges, ranging from the risks of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism to nuclear safety, as shown by the Fukushima accident. To meet those challenges and demands, we are of the view that the IAEA should be equipped with the appropriate resources to maintain its capacity.

I would like to comment on several topics covered in the report that are important to my delegation, namely, safeguards and nuclear safety and security. The report shows that the international nuclear community maintained a high level of safe performance in 2010. The nuclear incident at Fukushima, however, sent an unmistakable signal to the international community that we cannot afford to remain complacent when it comes to nuclear safety. In that regard, we welcome the adoption, by this year's General Conference of the IAEA, of the Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, which outlines practical measures to strengthen the global nuclear safety framework in 12 key areas. We look forward to its effective implementation through the full cooperation and participation of Member States. Properly implemented, those measures and the lessons learned from the Fukushima accident will serve to enhance global nuclear safety and promote the sustainable development of nuclear energy.

The work of the IAEA in the field of nuclear security, particularly the efforts to coordinate and enhance cooperation among various initiatives and activities, is also noteworthy. However, the threat of terrorism is real. Indeed, as evidenced by the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database, 172 incidents were reported during the one-year period ending in June. Those include 14 cases of unauthorized possession

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and/or attempts to sell or smuggle nuclear material or radioactive sources. In that connection, the Republic of Korea remains committed to improving nuclear security through its contributions to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund and its support for the relevant legal instruments and international activities.

In March 2012, the Republic of Korea will host the second Nuclear Security Summit. The 2012 Seoul Summit will provide an excellent opportunity to review the commitments made at the Summit held in Washington, D.C., in 2010, assess existing nuclear security practices and challenges, and consider ways and means for realizing a stronger, more cohesive and responsive global nuclear security regime. While recognizing the central role of the IAEA in that field, the Seoul Summit will try to maximize the synergies among various initiatives and activities to keep nuclear materials and related facilities in safe hands. We look forward to a successful outcome and request the cooperation and support of the international community to that end.

We highly appreciate the comprehensive report released by the Director General early in September on the application of safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (GOV/2011/53-GC(55)/24), the first of its kind in the history of the IAEA's dealings with the North Korean nuclear issue. The report is all the more meaningful as the Agency has provided an analysis of the uranium enrichment programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the first time since it was discovered in November 2010. The report states that that country's nuclear programme is a matter of serious concern and that information about the construction of a new uranium enrichment facility and a light-water reactor are deeply troubling.

Moreover, the report emphasizes that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has not abandoned its existing nuclear programme, contrary to the provisions of Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), and underlines that the country's uranium enrichment programme therefore clearly violates those resolutions. In the current climate of dialogue, we look forward to the Agency resuming an active role in the process of the denuclearization of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

In addition, we welcome the unanimous adoption of the resolution on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (GC(55)/RES/13) at the fifty-fifth IAEA General Conference, especially as it marks the first time that the international organization has condemned the country's uranium enrichment programme since it was discovered. The resolution expresses concern regarding the country's claimed uranium enrichment programme and light-water reactor construction and calls on the country to fully comply with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and to promptly cooperate with the IAEA in the full and effective implementation of IAEA comprehensive safeguards. In that context, we strongly urge the Democratic People's Republic of Korea once again to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes and to immediately cease all related activities, including its uranium enrichment programme.

We take note of the entry into force of the comprehensive safeguards agreement in five States and of additional protocols in 10 States during 2010. It is encouraging to hear that 110 States have already ratified the additional protocol. We urge other Member States that have not yet done so to conclude and bring into force the comprehensive safeguards agreement and its additional protocol.

In full support of the work of the IAEA, and with a view to achieving our common goal of harnessing nuclear energy in the service of peace and development for humanity, the Republic of Korea is pleased to sponsor the draft resolution (A/66/L.6) on the report of the IAEA.

**Mr. Abdelaziz** (Egypt) (*spoke in Arabic*): I would first like to extend my thanks to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mr. Yukiya Amano, for his presentation. I would like to underline that Egypt has become a sponsor of draft resolution A/66/L.6.

International crises in the fields of energy and climate change pose constraints on the growing energy needs of the developing world in terms of quantity and quality. The IAEA report (see A/66/95) demonstrates the continued importance, amid those challenges, of nuclear technology for electricity generation and points out that 60 countries have so far expressed an interest in exploring the use of nuclear energy. Many of those States will begin operating their first reactors by 2030. That attests to the growing interest in the inalienable right to acquire and use nuclear technologies for

peaceful purposes, in accordance with article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). That right was further reiterated in the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)), which emphasized the importance of respecting the decisions and policies of non-nuclear-weapon States regarding their plans to use nuclear energy for their development needs and for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in the implementation of such plans, without any constraints and through international cooperation on the necessary nuclear technologies and materials.

The timetable of Egypt's nuclear energy programme has continued to evolve and to be assessed, as Egypt undergoes fundamental transformation, to allow the consideration of recent lessons learned from other countries' experiences as we continue to make progress in the implementation of this national project, working on achieving its legitimate goals and responding to our development needs. Egypt looks forward to further cooperation with the IAEA, given the Agency's growing role in supporting the sustainable development of its non-nuclear-weapon member States that are party to the NPT, and in light of its role in facilitating their access to nuclear energy and responding to their needs in that important area.

Egypt remains at the forefront of countries that have provided unlimited support to the IAEA since its establishment; it has continued that support to date, based on its belief in the value of the IAEA's role in nuclear non-proliferation and in promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy to support the ambitions and global needs of developing countries in a wide range of areas.

States party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty ensure compliance with the comprehensive safeguards regime of the IAEA, which remains a major pillar of the non-proliferation system, through the Agency's verification and strengthening mechanisms. Nevertheless, that regime has yet to be fully effective as it lacks universality, especially in the Middle East region. Intensified international efforts are necessary to ensure implementation of the comprehensive safeguards system in all countries of the region without exception.

Significant progress is necessary to achieve a global comprehensive safeguards system, universality of the NPT and the accession to the NPT, as non-nuclear-weapon States, of three countries that remain outside the Treaty. That would encourage non-nuclear States to make further commitments and thus reinforce the NPT regime in a balanced and non-discriminatory manner both at regional and international levels.

At the regional level, all of the countries of the Middle East are in compliance with their obligations under the IAEA comprehensive safeguards system, except Israel, whose opaque nuclear activities have remained outside any international control, while it has continued to ignore dozens of appeals and international resolutions demanding its accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State and the submission of all of its nuclear facilities to the full scope of the IAEA safeguards. There is no doubt that this continuing situation increases the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and hinders the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region.

In that regard, Egypt believes that the conference on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, to be convened in 2012, will offer promising prospects for concrete progress. In that context, Egypt looks forward to the background documents to be prepared by the IAEA in accordance with the fourth action plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference. My country welcomes the seminar convened by the European Union on 6 and 7 July on supporting the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. The IAEA Forum on Experience of Possible Relevance to the Creation of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East, to be held on 21 and 22 November, represents an additional opportunity to contribute to, rather than replace, the substantive preparations in support of the 2012 conference set to take place under the auspices of the Secretary-General, pursuant to paragraph 7 (a) of part I, section IV, of the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol.I)).

The year 2011 witnessed the earthquake and tsunami disasters that caused the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident in March. Egypt reiterates its solidarity with the people of Japan in dealing with the effects of that disaster, and its willingness to provide assistance to any country facing a similar accident. Lessons must be drawn from the accident, which has shown the importance of the IAEA's central role in

matters relating to nuclear safety, including by assisting member States, at their request, in capacity-building and infrastructure, as well as in providing expertise and advice and in strengthening the nuclear safety culture in all parts of the world, while seeking to formulate comprehensive, progressive nuclear safety standards to be agreed by Member States in a gradual, comprehensive and transparent manner.

In that context, Egypt attaches great importance to the promotion of international cooperation aimed at strengthening national capacities in the field of nuclear safety and enabling them to respond to nuclear and radiological emergencies, in particular through the free flow of information and the transfer without prejudice of relevant technology. In accordance with its Statute, the IAEA should seek to assist member States with emergency preparedness and response to nuclear accidents, through capacity-building, including education and training in crisis management and technology transfer.

Those important issues were considered by the IAEA ministerial conference on nuclear safety held in Vienna in July 2011, which provided a forum for preliminary assessment of the Fukushima nuclear accident and for exchanging views on lessons learned aimed at further strengthening the framework on nuclear safety, emergency preparedness and response mechanisms. It also helped to launch a process — in which Egypt participated actively — that resulted in the adoption of the action plan of the outcome of the 2010 NPT Review. In the same vein, the high-level meeting convened by the Secretary-General on 22 September in New York was valuable in highlighting once again this important subject as well as the crucial role of the IAEA in this area.

Regarding nuclear security, the Seoul Summit to be held in March 2012 will serve as an opportunity to focus on the important issue of the security of nuclear materials and preventing them from falling into the hands of terrorists, complementing the other frameworks, including Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). On the other hand, the crucial role of the IAEA in the field of nuclear security must be anchored. Any guidelines or advice on nuclear security should be developed and negotiated in multilateral frameworks; and any initiatives and measures to enhance nuclear security and safety must not be used as a pretext for restricting the inalienable right of developing countries to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

In that regard, Egypt reiterates its concern about the continued imposition of unwarranted restrictions on exports to developing countries of material, equipment and technology that will be used for peaceful purposes. Egypt emphasizes especially the responsibility of those countries that are advanced in the nuclear field to respond positively to the needs of developing countries with respect to peaceful uses of nuclear power, by allowing them to participate to the maximum extent possible in the transfer of equipment, materials, scientific information and nuclear technology and enabling them to derive the greatest benefits within their sustainable development strategies.

In the field of technical cooperation, Egypt will continue to exchange experiences with countries in the Arab region and the African continent, because it believes in the importance of international cooperation activities in the field of peaceful use of nuclear energy. In that regard, Egypt stresses that priority must be given to the Agency's activities in the field of technical cooperation, with the aim of enabling Egypt and other developing countries to benefit from the use of nuclear technologies in various sectors including health, agriculture, food and water resources and radioisotope technology. Thus, we reaffirm the importance of securing and increasing funding for international cooperation which is one of the main pillars of the work of the Agency, in accordance with its Statute.

Egypt also renews its determination to intensify and expand cooperation with the IAEA with the aim of strengthening our national capacities in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear technology and to benefit from the full support of the Agency for our national efforts in efforts.

**Mr. Onemola** (Nigeria): I thank the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for his statement on the work of the Agency in the past year.

I would also like to convey my country's appreciation for the initiatives of Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon with regard to the effort to prevent future tragedies at nuclear facilities by strengthening the capacity of the IAEA to promote nuclear safety and security and to enhance cooperation among international organizations, particularly in the areas of emergency response and information-sharing. We have no doubt that the high-level meeting on nuclear safety and security held on the margins of the general debate

on 22 September will help build the political will needed to confront those challenges.

We commend Director General Amano and his team for delivering on the Agency's mandate in the areas of technical cooperation and nuclear safety, safeguards and security, despite numerous constraints, including in financial resources. Nigeria appreciates and commends their tireless efforts. We are delighted that the IAEA continues to contribute immensely to the maintenance of international peace and security, while ensuring that humanity derives the maximum benefit from nuclear science and technology in a safe and secure environment.

The tragic Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident in Japan has provoked global debate about the rationality of nuclear power. It has also led to a review of various measures that have been taken with regard to our common agenda of ensuring the safe and secure use of nuclear science and technology, as well as of ways of strengthening the Agency so as to deal with current and future challenges and enhance its capacity to further deliver the full benefits inherent in nuclear technology.

In that regard, I want to express my appreciation for the prompt and insightful initiatives of the Director General, including his decision to convene the June Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety and put together the resulting Action Plan, which has already been endorsed at the Agency's fifty-fifth General Conference in September, as well as at the high-level meeting held here the same month. We expect that the implementation of the Action Plan and other measures at both the national and regional levels, informed by the lessons of the Fukushima accident, will go a long way towards addressing concerns about insecurity and restoring confidence in nuclear technology.

In spite of the apprehensions raised by the Fukushima accident, Nigeria remains convinced that nuclear technology, safely and responsibly applied, can facilitate the attainment of our energy development goals and those of other Millennium Development Goals, and therefore has a vital role to play in serving humankind's immediate needs. The introduction of nuclear-powered electricity into our national energy mix is high on the Nigerian Government's transformational agenda. We are working closely with the IAEA towards that goal, while honouring the attendant obligations to ensure safety and security. That is why for us in Nigeria, transparency in handling the information coming out of the Fukushima accident and the lessons learned from it are important, as they will help us to avoid dangerous pitfalls.

My delegation notes with satisfaction the Agency's phenomenal achievements in the application of nuclear technology in the area of food and agriculture, including its role in collaborating with the Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Organization for Animal Health, the African Union and other strategic partners in the total eradication of the deadly cattle disease known as rinderpest. We encourage the Agency to continue in its efforts to assist its member States in applying that technology to the diagnosis and control of other transboundary animal diseases, and ultimately to the promotion of food security. The focus at the fifty-fifth General Conference on the application of nuclear techniques to prospecting for and managing water was very timely, because it addressed one of humankind's current needs in both developed and developing countries.

We also appreciate the priority the Agency has given to cancer control in developing countries and its commitment to helping Member States to fight that scourge. We urge the Agency to increase its support to African countries in the areas of cancer therapy and manpower development, through its Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy (PACT). We welcome the assistance rendered to Member States through the Programme's imPACT reviews, which assess countries' readiness to develop long-term radiation medicine capacity-building plans as part of a national cancer control programme.

Nigeria's health sector has benefited from the Agency's cooperation in capacity and infrastructure development for cancer control and management, through advances in nuclear medicine and radiotherapy, radio-oncology and nuclear medicine technology. Through such cooperation, 10 nuclear medicine facilities are to be built, between 2010 and 2016, and equipped in tertiary hospitals across the country, through national funding. It is our expectation that our national programmes will continue to benefit from the Agency's Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy.

On technical cooperation, we would like to note that the Agency's Technical Cooperation Programme has continued to make an invaluable contribution to the

efforts of Member States in addressing national development priorities and leveraging the comparative advantages of nuclear techniques. We welcome the increase in new resources reported by the Director General in his report, as well as the contributions of the United States and other donors under the Peaceful Uses Initiative, launched in 2010. I would like to encourage other Member States in a position to make extra budgetary contributions to join that United States initiative.

While the IAEA continues to coordinate multilateral efforts to ensure nuclear safety and security, we believe that the primary responsibility rests with Member States. In recognition of that principle, and in appreciation of the fact that with the benefits of nuclear technology come responsibilities, the Government of Nigeria has continued to build capacity, as well as to strengthen the requisite institutional framework.

In September, just two months ago, the Nigeria Atomic Energy Commission, the national focal agency for atomic energy development, was reconstituted as an independent and self-accounting agency. Furthermore, the Nigeria Nuclear Regulatory Authority is being strengthened to regulate our new nuclear power programme. In the area of nuclear waste management, which is key to the success of any national nuclear power programme, Nigeria, with a wide range of IAEA technical support in the areas of project design and implementation, has begun developing facilities for the comprehensive management of low- and intermediate-level radioactive wastes at the Nuclear Technology Centre at Sheda, in Abuja.

I would like to reaffirm Nigeria's commitment to the basic tenets of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and to assure the Assembly that our national nuclear power programme will continue to be purely for peaceful purposes, geared to the enhancement of the living standards of the peoples of Nigeria, and will remain within the framework of verifiable safeguards.

The NPT remains a pillar for keeping our world safe from nuclear holocaust. The role of the IAEA in promoting a safer world remains pivotal. Nigeria therefore appreciates the initiative of the Director General in holding a forum this month to reinvigorate the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. We also look forward to the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, as a forum vital to taking political decisions at the highest level on securing nuclear materials away from unauthorized end users.

In conclusion, I wish to reiterate Nigeria's support for and abiding faith in the IAEA, and our confidence in its leadership in putting the benefits of the atom within the reach of all in a safer and secure world.

**Mr. Al Habib** (Islamic Republic of Iran): Today nuclear technology, as the common heritage of humankind, has yielded peaceful applications in numerous fields, ranging from medicine, food and agriculture to providing a cost-effective, environmentally friendly and climatically benign source of energy, and has thus played a significant role in the advancement of human society. Taking into account that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), according to its Statute, should accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity, we underline its prime responsibility to assist member States, including by facilitating technology transfer and increasing their scientific and technological capabilities.

The inalienable right to the peaceful use of nuclear technology, without discrimination, constitutes the very foundation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This is set out in its article IV, in which States parties undertake to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We emphasize that such an inalienable right shall not be restricted under any circumstances, including through ulterior outside political considerations. At the same time we are of the view that the implementation of related provisions of the NPT and the statute of the IAEA requires a realistic and balanced approach. Such an approach, by providing incentives for membership and compliance, can guarantee the longevity, integrity and credibility of the NPT.

Unfortunately, developed States parties to the NPT, the main suppliers of nuclear high technology, have given rise to two dangerous impressions by continuing to apply a discriminatory, selective, highly restrictive and politically motivated approach in their nuclear cooperation with developing States parties. First, being a party to the NPT and the IAEA safeguards agreement does not facilitate nuclear

cooperation but rather impedes it, and therefore it is not a privilege. Secondly, States not parties to the Treaty are more richly and generously rewarded through nuclear cooperation.

It is a source of grave concern that those who have chosen not to accede to the NPT not only are not subject to any pressure to do so but are also encouraged and rewarded in different ways. A living example is the well-documented assistance and cooperation provided by certain Western countries — in particular the United States and the two nuclear-weapon States members of the European Union, the United Kingdom and France — to the Israeli regime, which, in addition to having an unsafeguarded nuclear programme, possesses one of the world's largest stockpiles of nuclear weapons. That of course is a clear case of non-compliance by those NPT States parties with their legal obligations under the Treaty. Indeed, such double standards and discriminatory and paradoxical policies are contrary to the letter and spirit as well as the universality of the NPT and only undermine the integrity of the Treaty.

Recalling the importance of the IAEA's responsibilities in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and energy, as well as its role as the sole competent body for verification activities in accordance with its Statute and the NPT, we strongly emphasize the need to avoid the use of extralegal unilateral measures and attempts to use the Agency as an instrument in support of shortsighted political interests, as they only undermine the authority and credibility of the IAEA. Unfortunately, over the past decade a few Western countries have pursued a selective and politically motivated approach towards the verification activities of the IAEA. By calling it a watchdog organization, they attempt to imply that the IAEA is solely a verification tool and has no other mandate.

In this context, and recalling that the IAEA statute stipulates that the Agency should conduct its activities in a way that furthers the establishment of safeguarded worldwide disarmament, I would like to reiterate that one of the neglected tasks of the IAEA is engagement in the nuclear disarmament process.

The Islamic Republic of Iran is extremely proud and highly honoured that, thanks to the activities of its courageous young nuclear scientists and despite all foreign-backed plots and plans, it has been able to exercise its inalienable right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Iran is fully committed to its legal obligations, and its nuclear activities are, and have always been, exclusively for peaceful purposes. Despite all external political pressure on the IAEA, it has repeatedly confirmed the non-diversion of nuclear materials and the peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme.

Finally, I would like to underline that from a legal point of view, the IAEA should verify only declared nuclear material. The recent report by the IAEA Director General on the Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in Iran states that the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at the nuclear facilities and at locations outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used, declared by Iran under its safeguards agreement. It is regrettable that the IAEA Director General, in his statement yesterday (see A/66/PV.46), made reference to all nuclear materials — which is legally incorrect.

**Mr. Osman** (Sudan) (*spoke in Arabic*): At the outset, I would like to extend our thanks to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for presenting the Agency's annual report to the General Assembly (see A/66/95). We commend the IAEA programmes and plans outlined in the report, which are designed to improve the transfer of technology for peaceful purposes, maintain an international system of nuclear security and bolster the safety of nuclear facilities. The report emphasizes the important role the Agency plays, particularly in the field of cooperation in the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and development.

We would like to commend the work of the previous Director General, Mr. Mohamed ElBaradei, and we wish his successor, Mr. Yukiya Amano, every success.

The Sudan attaches great importance to the contents of the report on the applications of nuclear technology in fostering food security, controlling insects and effectively managing water resources, as well as in modern irrigation systems and large-scale agricultural projects. From that perspective, improving the cooperation between the Agency and UNICEF on agricultural and educational enterprises, and with the World Health Organization, becomes increasingly important.

Assisting developing countries to improve their respective national technical systems complements the efforts of the Agency to implement its plans and technical cooperation programmes. We hope that cooperation will improve within the framework of the Agency's health programmes in order to revive and support continental and regional projects aimed at fighting insect carriers of malaria and other lethal diseases affecting Africans, and thus to enable the continent to successfully achieve its socio-economic development programmes, in particular the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the internationally agreed economic agenda.

The Sudanese delegation emphasizes the right of all States, including my country, to improve research and production of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination and in accordance with international terms of reference and commitments.

My delegation would like also to stress the need for States to refrain from putting pressure on the Agency or interfering with its activities, in order to preserve the Agency's credibility and its vital role. In that context, we call for justice and equity in tackling some of the outstanding issues involving some States, through dialogue and negotiations, with a view to reaching appropriate solutions.

Moreover, the delegation of the Sudan reiterates its firm position in supporting the aspirations of all geographical regions to declare themselves free from nuclear weapons, in accordance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which constitutes one of the main pillars in the international peace and security system. On that basis, we feel concerned by the fact that the Middle East region has for many decades, remained far from achieving that goal, due to opposition by Israel — the only country in the region than possesses nuclear weapons — and its refusal to place its nuclear programmes under the comprehensive IAEA safeguards regime, in addition to its continuous disregard for the appeals and repeated initiations made by the international community in that matter. Israel's adherence to the Treaty and its Additional Protocol are vital factors for eliminating the tension experienced in the region and could lead to strengthened regional security and the maintenance of international peace and security.

My country is equally enthusiastic in its hope that the Agency will continue to support the right of developing countries to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, along with the Agency's monitoring of such activities. It is our conviction that the production of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes would lead to a considerable surge in efforts towards development, given the low cost of electricity produced through nuclear energy as compared to other energy sources. The rising cost of alternative energy sources will force developing countries to look for faster and more practicable means to solve their problems of energy shortage.

The Sudan is persuaded that greater cooperation and support by developed countries for developing countries in the field of alternative energy sources would lessen the risk of resort to nuclear energy. We think that it is logical for the IAEA to encourage developed countries to work side by side with developing countries on that matter.

In that connection, my delegation welcomes the efforts of the Agency and of many developed countries to foster cooperation with the African States in the use of nuclear energy in the medical and health sectors, as well as on alternative energy projects in an effective manner conducive to achieving the MDGs.

**Mr. Cassidy** (Indonesia): Allow me first to warmly welcome our fellow country member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Lao People's Democratic Republic, as a new member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This now increases the IAEA members from ASEAN countries to nine. Indonesia stands ready to cooperate closely and to share its experience with the Lao People's Democratic Republic in many areas of nuclear cooperation.

On this occasion, we would like to express our support to the Director General for the way in which he has been carrying out his responsibilities at the IAEA, which has led to more weight being given to the Agency's technical role. We were delighted by his visit to Jakarta from 6 to 9 October. Apart from holding important meetings with major national stakeholders and visiting our nuclear facilities, in our capacity as the Chair of ASEAN, we also facilitated his visit to the ASEAN secretariat, where he met with its representatives and those of the Council of Permanent Representatives. It is our profound hope that such visits will strengthen IAEA cooperation, not only with Indonesia but also with ASEAN.

We express our sympathy to the people and Government of Japan over the unfortunate events that took place in March involving the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. We also express our admiration and respect for the tremendous courage and resilience shown by the Japanese emergency team in getting the facility back under control. As an expression of Indonesian solidarity with the people and Government of Japan, the Indonesian Nuclear Regulatory Agency, apart from sending rescue workers, medical assistance and supplies in the early days of the accident, offered to dispatch its nuclear emergency response team to Fukushima.

As the Chair of ASEAN, Indonesia also initiated a special meeting of the foreign ministers of Japan and ASEAN in April to promote further cooperation in disaster management. In May, one of our experts on nuclear radiological protection and emergency response was honoured by the opportunity to join an IAEA-led international fact-finding mission to Fukushima.

In order to restore public confidence in the safety and sustainability of nuclear power, including in Indonesia, it is of critical importance to address nuclear safety and place it high on the global agenda.

Globally, public expectations for bold action are high after the last nuclear accident. We should seize the present momentum to help in shaping a global rethinking on nuclear safety. In that regard, my country was pleased to see that, on 22 September, the IAEA General Conference unanimously endorsed the Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, which Ministers had requested in their declaration at the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety in June. Indonesia looks forward to finding ways and means to contribute actively to the implementation of the Action Plan.

We remain of the view that IAEA technical cooperation plays an indispensable role as the Agency's main vehicle for delivering on its mandate to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, especially in the developing regions of the world. Since joining the IAEA, in 1957, Indonesia has enjoyed a great deal of cooperation with the IAEA in many areas of nuclear applications not involving power generation, such as in nuclear techniques for water resources, research reactor construction and operation, uranium extraction, food irradiation, radioisotope production and mutation-assisted plant breeding. The extensive use of nuclear techniques for socio-economic development led to growing recognition of the importance of nuclear technology for development in Indonesia.

Therefore, we strongly feel that now is the time for Indonesia to share its long-developed knowledge and experience with other developing countries. In this regard, we are ready to serve as a technical cooperation destination country to further support the IAEA in promoting its technical cooperation programmes.

As a country that has benefited from a wide application of nuclear techniques for water, we support the decision of the Director General of the IAEA to prioritize nuclear techniques for water this year. Isotope tracer technology has been widely used by Indonesian universities, the national geology agency and the drinking water industry, as well as in geothermal exploration. For geothermal exploitation, isotope tracers have been utilized to determine recharge areas and the origin of geothermal fluids. Regarding water management, isotope technology has also been widely applied to resolve recharge area and groundwater dating. In Indonesia, isotope hydrology has contributed to the mitigation of water shortages in areas that have a problem with water sanitation.

The role of the Regional Cooperative Agreement (RCA) in the promotion of the use of nuclear technology for socio-economic development in the Asia-Pacific cannot be overlooked. In the almost 40 years of the RCA's existence, the participating countries and the Agency have accumulated valuable experience in cooperation and coordination of nuclear-related development activities in the region. Therefore, we are determined to continue our active participation in this regional process. As the current Chairman of the RCA, in April 2011 Indonesia hosted the 33rd Meeting of National RCA Representatives in Bali, with around 60 representatives from participating countries attending.

Indonesia has made progress this year in managing radioactive waste and spent fuel. We submitted our instrument of ratification of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management on 1 April.

Indonesia continues to support international cooperation in nuclear security and the centrality of the IAEA's role in this area. Therefore, Indonesia supports

the Agency's continued fostering of coordination and exchange of information with other relevant organizations and nuclear security-related initiatives in order to prevent duplication between Agency programmes and those under consideration by other entities, thus ensuring the continued effectiveness of the Agency's nuclear security programme. Indonesia also supports those who suggest that the Agency should establish a mechanism that would allow all member States to be involved in an inclusive manner in the development of Nuclear Security Series documents.

Together with representatives of the IAEA, Indonesia co-hosted the High-level Regional Workshop on the International Legal Framework for Nuclear Security, from 20 to 22 July. The Workshop, which was attended by representatives of ASEAN member countries, has raised awareness of the importance of strong and effective measures to enhance nuclear security.

From the discussion, Indonesia notes the value of model legislation and implementation kits for nuclear security that could be used to transpose certain provisions into national legislation. Indonesia emphasizes the importance of updating the IAEA's 2010 *Handbook on Nuclear Law: Implementing Legislation*, so that in the future it could serve as model legislation to speed up national implementation.

Our commitment to safeguards implementation remains strong. In collaboration with other countries in the Asia-Pacific region, Indonesia is part of efforts to enhance safeguards collaboration in the region by launching the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network. The Network serves as a vehicle to define how we implement the safeguards, assuring the use of nuclear energy solely for peaceful uses in the economically vibrant Asia-Pacific region.

On the issue of safeguards in the Middle East, we continue to support the IAEA taking a comprehensive and balanced approach in addressing non-proliferation issues in the region. Likewise, Indonesia has supported the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, including with regard to the convening of a conference in 2012 on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the region, and with the full support and engagement of the nuclear-weapon States.

In pursuit of paving a way for the realization of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, Indonesia fully supports the Director General's initiative to convene a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone forum in Vienna later this month, and stands ready to participate constructively in the process, both in its national capacity and its capacity as Chairman of the Commission for the South-East Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.

**Mr. Aquino** (Peru) (*spoke in Spanish*): My country has joined in sponsoring draft resolution A/66/L.6 on the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as an expression of our firm support of the Agency's work.

Peru, a founding member of the IAEA, has just concluded its term on the Board of Governors for the period 2009 to 2011, where it actively participated in addressing the main issues of the Agency. In recognition of its committed participation, the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States has endorsed Peru's candidature to return to the Board of Governors for the 2013 to 2015 term.

The nuclear accident in the Fukushima Daiichi plant has marked an important point in the Agency's work. While Peru recognizes that the primary responsibility for nuclear security falls on States, we are convinced that the IAEA plays a very important role in promoting international cooperation and in the coordination of global efforts to strengthen the global nuclear security regime. In that regard, we believe, with an eye to the Agency's mandate, technical specialization and broad membership, that it is the appropriate forum in which to address all issues related to nuclear security.

Although we would have preferred a more ambitious document, my delegation commends the approval of the post-Fukushima action plan, which contains a series of specific measures to strengthen nuclear security. It is a realistic document and has the merit of including the concerns of all Agency member States.

The progress made in the sphere of nuclear security should be seen in the overall framework of the initiative undertaken by the Director General of the IAEA in convening a ministerial-level conference in

June 2011 and in the high-level meeting on nuclear safety and security convened by the Secretary-General here at United Nations Headquarters in September, as well as other significant initiatives undertaken by the international community. In applauding and encouraging such initiatives, my delegation wishes to emphasize that it is necessary that throughout this process of strengthening the nuclear security regime, the central function of the Agency in coordinating such efforts must be preserved.

At the national level, my delegation wishes to highlight the important work undertaken jointly with the Agency. If I may, I would like to highlight some of the technical cooperation activities that are geared to supporting the National Institute for Neoplastic Diseases in fighting cancer, the National Agrarian University La Molina in its projects to improve grains and native grain varieties, and the Peruvian Nuclear Energy Institute in its research activities, as well as the country's other significant research institutes, such as the Peruvian University Cayetano in its projects to improve South American cameloids.

By reiterating Peru's support for the management of the IAEA Director General, Ambassador Yukiya Amano — specifically the work related to nuclear applications in health, agriculture and water treatment — we wish to highlight the fact that the Director General visited Peru at the end of June 2011. He was able to observe directly the progress in various projects that the Agency has undertaken in Peru, all of which play an important role in developing the fight against poverty, and in agriculture, ground water and areas such as human health, industry, nuclear security and other areas.

Peru believes that in order to give adequate attention to the needs of developing countries, the Agency should focus its priorities on the following four areas. First is the fight against cancer. Taking into account that two thirds of diagnosed cases of cancer occur in developing countries, Peru believes that it is urgent to create national capacities, both in training professionals and in acquiring equipment for diagnosis and treatment. Second is improvement of food availability through nuclear applications in agriculture. Third is support for member States that decide to implement nuclear power plans by supplying them with the necessary technical, economic and legislative assistance. Fourth is improving the study of water through isotopic techniques for water purification and using those techniques in agriculture and the management of groundwater resources.

In the regional arena, since 1984 Peru has been an active participant in the Regional Agreement of Technical Cooperation for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean, with special emphasis on projects linked to training human resources and developing infrastructure in areas related to health, agriculture, energy and hydrology. I should also emphasize that in 2010 Peru joined the Ibero American Forum of Nuclear and Radiation Safety and Security Regulatory Agencies, which works actively to standardize national regulatory legislation.

In this Hall, we would like to reiterate our support for and recognition of the Agency and its more than 50 years as the principal international governmental forum for scientific and technical cooperation in the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and as the guarantor of compliance with international commitments to use nuclear installations and materials for exclusively peaceful purposes.

**Mr. Langeland** (Norway): Norway is pleased to sponsor of the draft resolution on the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (A/66/L.6). My Government attaches great importance to the IAEA. Besides being a key guardian of our collective non-proliferation regime, it is an important partner in promoting social and economic development while ensuring the safety and security of peaceful nuclear programmes. Through its extensive Technical Cooperation Programme, the Agency plays an important role in contributing to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals.

Nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament are closely linked. We cannot achieve the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, as set out in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), unless there is confidence in the integrity of the non-proliferation regime. Thus it is vital that we provide the Agency with the necessary legal tools to implement its non-proliferation mandate.

Norway therefore reiterates that the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols constitute the verification standard. Norway also remains convinced that the IAEA has an important role to play in verifying nuclear disarmament. Norway

continues to urge countries with outstanding proliferation issues to cooperate fully with the Agency in resolving these matters and in demonstrating the exclusively peaceful nature of their nuclear programmes.

Achieving a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East is an important goal both from a regional point of view and to reinforce the global non-proliferation regime. Norway will chair the IAEA forum on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East to be held this month in Vienna and believes that it will represent a significant contribution on the part of the IAEA towards that goal.

The 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons also underlined the importance of international cooperation with regard to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The tragic event in Fukushima earlier this year, as well as other safety incidents, has demonstrated the critical importance of safety to nuclear energy. The role of the IAEA will thus be even more crucial in the years to come.

We look forward to working closely with the Agency in promoting nuclear security. Norway has provided substantial voluntary contributions to support the IAEA's work to strengthen nuclear safety and security in developing countries and to the establishment of a nuclear fuel bank. It is imperative that we, the member States, provide adequate and predictable funding so that the Agency can carry out its important mandate. It is equally important that the international community demonstrate full political support for the IAEA. My delegation expects that today's draft resolution will be adopted by consensus.

**Mrs. `izare** (Ethiopia): I would first like to take note with satisfaction of the annual report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (see A/66/95), which describes the Agency's significant achievements during 2010. My appreciation also goes to Ambassador Yukiya Amano, Director General of the IAEA, for his comprehensive and informative statement on the main developments in the Agency's activities during that period. My delegation is a sponsor of draft resolution A/66/L.6, on the report.

We are pleased to recognize the progress made by the IAEA over the past year in further enhancing its contribution to global efforts to use atomic energy for peaceful purposes. We remain convinced that within the framework of its three pillars, the Agency will continue to strengthen its technical support role to expand international cooperation in the peaceful application of nuclear energy. We believe that the Agency's sustained technical assistance to developing nations — particularly in the areas of agriculture, human health, water resource management, energy planning, non-destructive testing and radiation protection — should be highlighted and its technical assistance programmes strengthened. In this regard we welcome the budgetary increase for the Technical Cooperation Fund.

Ethiopia attaches great importance to the work of the IAEA and appreciates the useful technical cooperation that the Agency is providing to member States, particularly developing nations. The Agency's growing role in helping developing countries achieve their socio-economic development goals is indeed encouraging, especially in its efforts to combat and eradicate diseases in cattle, which have resulted in tangible progress in the agriculture and livestock sectors. Moreover, many of the Agency's projects have helped to ensure access to clean water and promote environmental sustainability. In this context, and in order to reach the goals set by the Millennium Declaration (resolution 55/2) by 2015, the Agency's technical assistance programme should be strengthened with a view to expanding the scope of its activities aimed at supporting developing countries, and particularly least developed ones.

Ethiopia is a beneficiary of the IAEA's Technical Cooperation Programme. Among the various areas where we have technical cooperation with the Agency is an ongoing project to eradicate the tsetse fly from the Southern Rift Valley region of Ethiopia through an integrated pest management approach. I am very pleased to report that the project has started to benefit several communities by helping them to regain their farmland and resume their normal livestock activities. Strengthening such concrete gains requires enhanced technical support from the Agency and an integrated development approach that takes into account proper land-use planning and management.

It is also worth mentioning that the technical cooperation between Ethiopia and the Agency in the area of human health has resulted in establishing a modest national infrastructure for the application of nuclear medicine and radiotherapy. A project is being designed for 2012-2017 to consolidate the existing

radiotherapy and nuclear medicine facilities in five regional state university hospitals for efficient diagnosis and curative and palliative treatment for cancer patients. I would therefore like to request that the Agency further strengthen its cooperation in this area, in order to combat cancer through sustainable therapy programmes. We are also encouraged by our technical cooperation with the IAEA in applying isotope techniques in the management of our water resources and by our progress to date in implementing that cooperation programme.

I wish to take this opportunity to express our gratitude for the technical support that we receive through the Agency and its member States and from the African Development Bank, the Food and Agriculture Organization and other international organizations in these areas, in particular for the eradication of the tsetse fly and trypanosomiasis from Ethiopia. We welcome the steps the Agency has taken to formalize the cooperation framework in support of the Pan-African Tsetse and Trypanosomiasis Eradication Campaign, as that framework is critical to eradicating poverty and to increasing agricultural productivity. We call on the Agency to continue to accord high priority to the implementation of the cooperation framework.

We consider peaceful nuclear applications a critical input to our continued efforts to carry out national development strategies, policies and programmes. Indeed, we very much appreciate the Agency's technical support in the development and completion of our Country Programme Framework for the period 2012-2017. Obviously, the Framework is a significant step in efforts to develop our national nuclear science and technology infrastructure, and we request the Agency to extend its cooperation for the full implementation of the Framework.

Ethiopia supports the Agency's efforts to promote and ensure global nuclear safety. Ethiopia is committed to further strengthening the national radiation and nuclear safety and security infrastructure and to ensuring the safe operation of equipment that uses radiation sources. The Ethiopian Radiation Protection Authority will continue to work towards full implementation of regulatory control systems in all thematic safety areas. In that regard, my delegation would like to commend the activities of the IAEA in assisting member States, including my own country, in the peaceful use of nuclear energy through the development of effective and efficient programmes to improve scientific, technological and regulatory capabilities.

We firmly believe it is necessary to ensure, on a systematic basis, the provision of sufficient and predictable resources to the Agency's technical programmes and, more importantly, a balanced distribution of resources to its safeguards and technical cooperation activities in the area of nuclear safety. That is important, especially in view of the fact that the Agency's role in transferring peaceful technology is so necessary to developing countries for the achievement of their socio-economic goals.

In conclusion, allow me to extend once again our support to the IAEA for its efforts in the promotion of international cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects. We hope the IAEA will continue to promote its noble objectives into the next year.

**Mr. El-Mesallati** (Libya) (*spoke in Arabic*): At the outset, I would like to express our appreciation and gratitude to Mr. Yukiya Amano, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), for presenting the Agency's report to the General Assembly (see A/66/95).

Having examined the report of the Agency submitted to this session of the Assembly, our country's delegation would like to express its heartfelt appreciation to the secretariat of the IAEA, in particular the Department of Technical Cooperation, for its rapid response, support and efforts to strengthen cooperation in the fields of health, water resources management and education, which are our national priorities.

Our country's delegation would like to emphasize the rights of developing countries to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, to have access to nuclear material and equipment and to exchange and transfer scientific and technical information in that regard.

Our country clearly declares its position on the need to take practical steps to support the Agency, with a view to preserving its credibility and to implementing, in a balanced manner, its three pillars — non-proliferation, technical cooperation and verification — and the comprehensive safeguards regime and additional protocols.

We call on the entire international community to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and to the comprehensive safeguards regime so as to demonstrate its commitment to the international treaties, agreements and conventions that it has signed.

Libya expresses its support for the Director General of the Agency, in particular his statement before the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT. We believe that nuclear disarmament should be of the utmost importance to the Agency and that it plays a significant role in verification activities. Nuclear disarmament has a positive impact and will help strengthen all efforts towards non-proliferation.

In that connection, our country commends the activities of the Agency to foster international cooperation in the fields of nuclear and radiological safety. We place great emphasis on that issue, and thus Libya has acceded to the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident. We have participated in all activities in that regard.

We have set up an office to oversee nuclear and radiological safety and security. It is an independent monitoring agency that, under enforced national legislation, will execute its mandate in full independence, in compliance with the Agency's standards. We also commend the Agency's role in combating any threat by terrorist groups to use nuclear weapons.

Furthermore, the National Transitional Council expresses our interest in fostering cooperation with all friendly States and with the Agency in order to secure all radioactive material in Libya, which is now in safe areas and can be accessed only by permission from the authorities. A delegation from the Agency will visit Libya shortly to verify that such material is protected.

Our country places the highest emphasis on international peace and security, in particular in the Middle East region. The Middle East has become a hotbed of tension because Israel possesses nuclear arms, which has led other countries to seek to obtain such weapons.

It has been more than 15 years since the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference adopted a resolution to establish in the Middle East a zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction. Such a zone was also underscored in the outcome document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. That Conference highlighted that the resolution would continue to be in effect until all its purposes and objectives, including the achievement of the universality of the Treaty, had been achieved.

The conference to be held in 2012 will be attended by all countries of the Middle East with a view to underscoring the importance of implementing the above-mentioned resolution, namely, the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction. The conference will be held in Finland. Our country expresses its full support for that conference and for its goals of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and peace and security in the region.

My country's delegation calls on all nuclear-weapon countries to adopt programmes to eliminate their nuclear arsenals and to put an end to all programmes for the development of such weapons, pursuant to the legal commitments undertaken in article VI of the NPT and highlighted by the 2010 NPT Review Conference, which stated that the NPT should represent a firm commitment to destroy all nuclear arsenals and that otherwise the Treaty would be meaningless.

As long as one nuclear weapon exists, the world faces an enormous danger and a commensurate responsibility on the part of nuclear-weapon States. Otherwise, nuclear-weapon-free zones will be meaningless.

**Mr. Ja'afari** (Syrian Arab Republic) (*spoke in Arabic*): Despite the unanimous view that the only actual nuclear danger in the Middle East lies in Israel's possession of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery to distant regions, some of those who turn a blind eye to this clear-cut situation are pleased to open illusory fronts with suspect motives. Needless to say, such dishonest and non-objective actions evidently expose the falsity of their assertions that they care about the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the region of the Middle East.

For decades, they themselves were responsible for supplying Israel with the nuclear technology and materials that enabled it to acquire nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, including sophisticated submarines. They tried their best to divert attention

from Israel's nuclear weapons during the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, held in New York last year.

The prevailing hypocrisy on nuclear issues that marks the statements and attitudes of some representatives of Western States hinders progress in nuclear non-proliferation efforts. It irresponsibly encourages nuclear proliferation by a party that is still outside the NPT and that refuses to subject its nuclear installations to the international monitoring of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In that connection, I would recall that the conduct of those Western States violates articles I and II of the NPT. The Agency must therefore hold those Western States accountable and responsible for those violations.

We regret that we are hearing words that only heighten our concerns, such as the crass insinuation made against my country by the observer of the European Union (EU) in his statement yesterday (see A/66/PV.46). We would like to remind him that many EU member States do not at all comply with their commitments under the NPT. I refer to that state of non-compliance for two main reasons. The first is the presence of nuclear weapons in the territory of non-nuclear European States. The second is the fact that those Western States continue to supply Israel with nuclear technology and materials and their means of delivery.

In his statement yesterday, the Director General of the IAEA said that the Agency had finally come to the conclusion that it was very likely that the building destroyed at the Dair Alzour site in 2007 housed a nuclear reactor that should have been declared to the Agency. He went on to say that in June the IAEA Board of Governors found Syria to be in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations, and reported that non-compliance to the Security Council and the General Assembly. In that connection, allow me to make the following observations.

First, the IAEA Director General knows full well that Syria made the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) one of its main national priorities. Syria therefore hastened to accede very early to the NPT, doing so in 1968. By the same token, it signed a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency in 1992.

Moreover, in 2003, when Syria was a member of the Security Council, it presented a draft resolution on behalf of the Arab Group that is still in blue ink in the Security Council. That draft resolution was designed to create a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

These examples show that our national commitment is credible and should not be questioned. When it was presented in 2003, the draft resolution, which is in accordance with the provisions and objectives of the IAEA, clashed with the opposition of an influential permanent, nuclear-weapon State in the Security Council that threatened to use its veto if Syria insisted on putting the draft resolution to a vote.

Second, the Security Council and the IAEA did not condemn Israel's flagrant aggression against my country's sovereignty in 2007, probably because they are inured to Israel's violations of resolutions of international legitimacy and do not hold it accountable. As the Assembly well knows, Israel refused to cooperate with the Agency or to allow its inspectors to verify potential sources of pollution emanating from the Israeli rockets that were used to bomb the Dair Alzour site, as well as the materials it used in contaminating and destroying the bombed site.

In that respect, Israel's continued refusal to cooperate with the Agency's requirements, its continued improvement of its military nuclear capability outside of any international control or supervision and its disregard for all appeals to create a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, diminish the credibility of the NPT system and threaten the security and stability of the peoples and States of the Middle East.

These are extremely grave matters. We had hoped that the IAEA Director General would have referred to those issues in his statement, instead of resorting to such expressions as "highly probable".

Third, as a very useful exercise, I will now read out to colleagues a paragraph from the memoir of the former Director General of the IAEA, Mr. Mohamed ElBaradei, *The Age of Deception — Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous Times*. The paragraph is found on pages 228 and 229 of the memoir.

(*spoke in English*)

> "One of the strangest and most striking examples of nuclear hypocrisy, multilateral and multifaceted, must surely be Israel's bombing of the Dair Alzour installation in Syria in September 2007, and the aftermath of that attack. Speculation began almost immediately that the site had housed a nuclear facility. Syria denied the accusations. Israel and the United States remained officially silent, although American officials talked anonymously on the subject to the media. I spoke out strongly, noting that any country with information indicating that the bombed facility was nuclear was under a legal obligation to report it to the IAEA. But no one came forward with such a report. For the six weeks following the bombing — the most crucial period in terms of our seeing inside the facility — we were unable to obtain any high resolution imagery from commercial satellites."

(*spoke in Arabic*)

He states that the United States of America refused to supply the IAEA with the high-resolution imagery that the United States claimed indicated the presence of a building containing a nuclear reactor in Dair Alzour. If the accusations by the United States had been correct, why would they have refused to submit those high-resolution satellite images, as they were the ones who possessed them. That was the question asked by Mr. ElBaradei.

I will continue reading from the same paragraph.

(*spoke in English*)

> "On October 28, in New York, I gave an interview on CNN's *Late Edition* with Wolf Blitzer. In response to Blitzer's question as to whether the Syrian facility was a nuclear reactor, I said we had not seen any evidence to conclude one way or the other. But I was clear on one point: that 'to bomb first and then ask questions later,' as Israel had done, was deliberately undermining the system. Only the IAEA, I pointed out, had the means to verify allegations of clandestine nuclear activity. In another interview, with Charlie Rose two days later, I pointed out that Israel's 1981 attack on Iraq's Osirak reactor had only served as motivation to accelerate Saddam Hussein's clandestine nuclear program."

(*spoke in Arabic*)

Mr. ElBaradei continues on page 230 of his memoir,

(*spoke in English*)

> "but it was clear that my condemnation of the bombing at Dair Alzour had touched a nerve. John Bolton was openly supportive of Israel's action."

(*spoke in Arabic*)

John Bolton was the American Permanent Representative to the United Nations three years ago.

(*spoke in English*)

> "In an interview on CNN's *Late Edition*, Wolf Blitzer asked Bolton what he thought of my public assertion that Israel should have brought its 'evidence' to the IAEA. 'If you believe that,' Bolton retorted, 'I have a bridge to sell you. The notion that Israel or the United States would put their national security in the IAEA's hands is just delusional.'"

(*spoke in Arabic*)

That is what Bolton said when he was asked to respond to ElBaradei. The memoir continues:

(*spoke in English*)

> "To hear these sentiments coming from the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations was dreadful."

(*spoke in Arabic*)

Fourth, compliance by the States parties to the Agency Statute makes it necessary for the United States of America to inform the Agency of the information it had before destroying the building, and not eight months later. The same thing applies to Israel, which supplied the Agency with information, if such information were accurate. Rather, it launched a military attack on the territory of the State of Syria, penetrating the air space of a neighbouring State.

The Agency did not deal with this in an integrated manner, nor did it take necessary measures in accordance with its responsibilities and mandate with regard to the encroachments and violations of the

international nuclear commitments by Israel and by the United States of America, in accordance with the NPT.

Fifth, most of the contents and the findings of the Agency in the course of the mandate of the current Director General regarding the Dair Alzour site have relied on the imagery and analyses presented by the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States of America. My country would therefore question the credibility of such information received by the Agency, as well as the nature of corroborating documents, taking into consideration that such information was presented by a State in pursuit of a political agenda that is hostile to the interests of my country, Syria.

Sixth, the current report of the Director General contains incomplete findings based on information that lacks credibility and inclusiveness. The Agency's assessments clearly run counter to its previous assessments, as we have mentioned previously.

Seventh, the continued confusion between the legal commitment of a member State by virtue of its safeguards agreement, and its voluntary accession to the additional protocol, has no legal basis and constitutes another means of bringing political pressure to bear on Syria.

Eighth, with respect to States that attempt to cover up for Israel's nuclear weapons, we pose a question to them, to the Director General of the IAEA, and to the IAEA. We would like to ask all of them what action they have taken to implement Security Council resolution 487 (1981), which was adopted on 19 June 1981 — meaning that more than 30 years have passed since then. What have they done to carry out that resolution? At this point, allow me to quote the Security Council's call on Israel in paragraph 5 of the resolution:

(*spoke in English*)

> "to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards".

(*spoke in Arabic*)

That resolution was adopted three decades ago.

Next, in its important *Yearbook on Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) devoted a complete section to what it termed Israeli nuclear forces. From this rostrum, I call on the IAEA and the nuclear-weapons depositary States of the NPT, as well as the nuclear-weapons States members of the Security Council, to read that chapter and learn the necessary lessons. I am talking about the book I have in my hand. In particular, those specialists here who work on the First Committee and on disarmament matters know what I am talking about. This book was not published in Damascus; it was published in Stockholm.

**Mr. Haniff** (Malaysia): On behalf of the delegation of Malaysia, I join others in thanking the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for his presentation to the General Assembly of the annual report of the Agency for 2010 (see A/66/95). Malaysia is also pleased to sponsor draft resolution A/66/L.6. My delegation also wishes to welcome the Dominican Republic, the Lao People's Democratic Republic and Tonga as new member States of the Agency.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) entitles States parties to have access to nuclear technology. The Treaty also provides for the exchange of nuclear knowledge and scientific information and fosters cooperation among States for the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In that connection, Malaysia greatly appreciates the IAEA's role in assisting States in planning for and using nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes. The promotion of peaceful applications of nuclear energy constitutes a fundamental activity of the IAEA, as highlighted in IAEA documents. In that regard, my delegation is of the view that the IAEA must be equipped with sufficient, assured and predictable resources to enable it to implement its mandated activities so that States pursuing peaceful uses of nuclear energy can benefit from the transfer of nuclear technology.

As outlined in the Agency's report, more than 60 countries have expressed an interest in exploring the use of nuclear power. Those countries include my own, Malaysia. As part of Malaysia's economic transformation programme, nuclear power development has been identified as one of the main projects for future power generation. It is aimed purely at ensuring an adequate electricity supply for the people of Malaysia beyond the year 2020. The Government of Malaysia is currently conducting an in-depth study of the project before making a final decision on the matter. Our focus is on developing a comprehensive nuclear programme, including legal and

regulatory frameworks, involving the assessment of public opinion and creation of a public relations plan. The studies will be conducted by independent consultants, taking into consideration lessons learned from major nuclear incidents in the past, as well as the results of stress tests on nuclear power plants by member States. The overarching objective is to ensure that the highest standards of nuclear safety are observed at all times, thus contributing to strengthening global nuclear safety.

With regard to the development of a more comprehensive legislative and regulatory framework, my delegation appreciates the IAEA's input into our draft comprehensive nuclear law, which seeks to strengthen existing legislation. In addition, Malaysia has also passed a strategic trade act, covering export control measures for all single- and dual-use strategic goods, including nuclear, chemical, biological and missile-related items, as well as conventional arms.

At the regional level, Malaysia has always recognized the importance of regional cooperation and has participated actively in many regional projects under the aegis of the Agency. Malaysia welcomes the Agency's efforts to create a common framework for nuclear waste and spent fuel management for the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) through the consultancy meeting on recommendations in spent fuel and radioactive waste management for ASEAN held in March, and through other efforts in the field of nuclear security and safety.

Notwithstanding the growing renewed interest in nuclear power generation, Malaysia still accords high priority to the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology for enhanced food and water security, human health, natural resources and environmental management, industrial development and medical applications. These sectors are being supported by further developments in national capabilities in peaceful nuclear technology research and development, commercialization, the development of a more comprehensive legislative and regulatory framework, technological infrastructure, human capital development, competency verification, public information, compliance with the international system of nuclear governance, and engagement in international cooperation.

In that regard, my delegation wishes to thank the IAEA, particularly its Technical Cooperation Department, for its continuing support for the implementation of IAEA technical cooperation projects and various other activities in Malaysia, including the trust shown to Malaysia in continuing to have it host the IAEA postgraduate educational course in radiation protection and the safety of radiation sources. My delegation also wishes to express its gratitude to other member States that have shown interest in the course, which has attracted candidates from beyond our region as well as within it.

In addition, Malaysia is also pleased and appreciative of the fact that the Malaysian Nuclear Agency has been redesignated, for the period 2010-2014, as the IAEA Collaborating Centre for Radiation Processing of Natural Polymer and Nanomaterials. Among other things, the Centre has demonstrated the radiation-aided production of non-toxic, environmentally friendly palm oil acrylates for printing applications.

With regard to the assurance of supplies of nuclear fuel, my delegation welcomes the continued discussions on the development of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle under the auspices of the IAEA. Malaysia reiterates that any further consideration of the issue of assurance of supply must be based on a coherent and comprehensive conceptual framework that adequately addresses the views and concerns of all Member States. Malaysia remains convinced that further consideration of individual proposals on this matter must be preceded by a consensus agreement adopted by the General Conference on the conceptual framework that outlines the specific political, technical, economic and legal parameters. My delegation notes the Agency's continuing efforts to establish and improve the concept of a low-enriched-uranium bank facility. Nonetheless, we wish to underline that such an arrangement must accommodate the inalienable rights of NPT States parties to nuclear technology.

With regard to international effort to establish a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, which was agreed to by States party to the NPT during the NPT Review Conference in 2010, my delegation welcomes the appointment of Mr. Jaakko Laajava, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Security Policy of Finland, as facilitator. We also welcome the designation of Finland as the host Government for the 2012 Conference, which could provide the impetus for the creation of

such zone in the Middle East. We also support the efforts of the Director General to convene an IAEA forum in Vienna later this month to further support this process.

Finally, Malaysia would like to express once again its appreciation to the Director General of IAEA, as well as to the IAEA secretariat for their significant and valuable work in fulfilling the Agency's mandate.

**The Acting President**: We have heard the last speaker in the debate on agenda item 86.

We shall now proceed to consider draft resolution A/66/L.6. Before giving the floor to the speakers in explanation of vote before the voting, may I remind delegations that explanations of vote are limited to 10 minutes and should be made by delegations from their seats.

**Mr. Ri Tong Il** (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): Concerning the general statements made earlier, the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would like to express its heartfelt thanks to the representatives who showed attention and support for the peaceful settlement of the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula.

Concerning draft resolution A/66/L.6 and the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (A/66/95), the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea totally and categorically rejects that report. The report again refers to the nuclear issue of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, as well as to the Agency's previous history of behaving impartially. In particular, the report refers to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with no basis in fundamental reality, and is therefore misleading with regard to that reality.

The delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would like to make a few comments concerning the factors that violate and distort the fundamental reality.

First of all, the report refers to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as if it were a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). That is not the case in reality. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea withdrew from IAEA in 1994 and from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 2003. Those withdrawals are in line with international law. In particular, article X of the Treaty stipulates that States parties can withdraw from the NPT if the supreme interest of that State is in jeopardy, and that was in fact the case for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In 2002, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was included on the Bush Administration's list of the axis of evil; everybody knows that. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea was included on the Bush Administration's list of seven countries in line for nuclear pre-emptive strikes, and those policies, which were part of the Bush Administration's nuclear doctrine, compelled the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to withdraw from the NPT. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea made a firm decision to exit the Treaty in order to defend our supreme interest, namely, the security, dignity and sovereignty of the country.

When the Democratic People's Republic of Korea joined the NPT, it was in the expectation that the nuclear danger would be removed from the peninsula. As everybody knows, the United States introduced nuclear weapons into South Korea in 1957. The first nuclear weapons arrived in South Korea in 1957. The total had reached 1,000 by 1970. Everybody can imagine the threat of nuclear disaster with which the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has been living for over six decades. Given that situation, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had no choice but to withdraw from the NPT.

Secondly, with respect to the fundamental reality, the report makes reference to uranium enrichment. Everybody has an equal right to enrich uranium under international law. That is in line with international trends and is reflected in the report, which states that over 90 countries are now moving towards peaceful nuclear energy. Those countries opted for nuclear power to meet their energy needs, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has made the same choice. In particular, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is a party to the Six-Party Talks, under which the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has that right, which is stipulated as a component of the Six-Party Talks.

If one considers the historical background, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has been damaged in its construction of independent nuclear power. In 1994, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States agreed on a framework, the first ever historical document between the two sides, which have had hostile relations. By 2003, the

United States was obliged to provide light-water reactors in compensation for freezing the verified moderate reactor that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had been conducting with a capacity of 2 million kilowatts of electricity. But by the year 2002, as I said, the Bush Administration unilaterally abrogated that agreement without giving prior notice to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. So far, the United States has not paid a single penny to compensate for the loss it caused the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. We have computed already how much compensation the United States should pay for that; everybody can imagine how much that should be.

Thirdly, there is mention of the threat of nuclear tests to international peace and security. Again, that is not the case and goes against the fundamental reality. As I said, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States made an agreement and adopted it in 1994. That was the first-ever agreed framework between the two sides, the first-ever historical agreement. Under that agreement, there is one component that stipulates that the United States is committed not to use nuclear weapons and not to threaten the security of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. But that was not the case with the United States. In 2002, the United States listed the Democratic People's Republic of Korea along with Iran and Iraq as the axis of evil. First, Iraq was mercilessly attacked with armed invasion by the United States, and everybody knows what has happened so far. One month after the end of the Iraq war, the Bush Administration openly said that the next target would be the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea said that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is not Iraq.

So those are the threats that have been caused so far by the United States. More than ever before, we are under increasing nuclear threat from nuclear-powered submarines carrying nuclear weapons and from nuclear-powered aircraft carriers carrying massive amounts of weapons of destruction and different types of sophisticated weaponry that daily enter the Korean peninsula, South Korea and its vicinity. This is the threat, with a military alliance, that is growing increasingly stronger, with a negative impact on the Korean peninsula, the region and the world as a whole.

Concerning the demarche by the Director General of the IAEA, he referred to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea once again and urged it to implement the Security Council resolutions against it. Those Security Council resolutions — two resolutions — were totally and categorically rejected by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, as each of them was adopted, as being of no help at all to peace and security on the Korean peninsula, and actually undermining peace and security there, because they do not reflect fundamental realities.

The United States has been a perpetrator in terms of the nuclear threat to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea since 1957. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has been under that nuclear threat — a victim. But the Security Council resolutions view this in a different way, as if the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were an offender, a perpetrator of the nuclear threat against world peace and security. I would like to remind the Director General of the fundamental reality of what is happening and of what has occurred in the past.

In conclusion, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea delegation would like to clarify its position on the settlement of the nuclear issue. The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea firmly believes that military exercises and military alliances are not an option or a solution to the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula. The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea remains committed to the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula through the Six-Party Talks, at the earliest possible date, without any preconditions and in the context of the full implementation of the 19 September joint statement, in a comprehensive and balanced manner based on the principle of simultaneous action.

That is what our great leader, the respected Kim Jong Il, underlined in his recent interview with ITAR-TASS.

**The Acting President**: The Assembly will now take a decision on draft resolution A/66/L.6. May I take it that the Assembly decides to adopt draft resolution A/66/L.6?

*Draft resolution A/66/L.6 was adopted* (resolution 66/7).

**The Acting President**: I shall now call on those representatives who wish to speak in exercise of the right of reply.

May I remind members that statements in exercise of the right of reply are limited to 10 minutes for the first intervention and to five minutes for the second intervention and should be made by delegations from their seats.

**Mr. Ri Tong Il** (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): Thank you, Madam President, for giving me the floor once again.

The delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea categorically rejects the remarks made by the representatives of Japan and South Korea, because they have no fundamental reality or truth as concerns the Korean peninsula, as I said earlier.

I should like to draw the attention of the representatives participating in this meeting to one issue: South Korea is under the nuclear umbrella of the United States, as I mentioned earlier. It has been living under the nuclear umbrella of the United States, the largest nuclear-weapon State. With respect to South Korea, the first thing we want to know is why it allowed a foreign Power, the largest nuclear-weapon Power, to bring this to our land — in a move that is disastrous to our national survival, our national dignity and our national sovereignty. That is the first question that the nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have in their hearts. I think that most of the participants in this meeting will share this view.

As far as United States nuclear weapons in South Korea, in 1975 a shocking and surprising media report came out. A parliamentary debate was ongoing in the United States on the military budget of that country for 1976, and it was only then that the fact that nuclear weapons had been deployed to South Korea was revealed. It was only then that South Korean authorities learned that there were nuclear weapons in South Korea. No South Korean authorities or politicians were aware of that fact.

There is another factor to which the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would like to draw attention: the military alliance. As I said before, this is a very serious concern for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the countries in the North-East Asian region and in our Asia-Pacific region.

The military exercises, in scope and in nature, are giving rise to increasingly grave concerns. Even as we speak, the United States and South Korea are conducting joint military exercises in South Korea. They began on 27 October and continue through tomorrow. How many people are participating? How many troops? A total of 140,000 troops are participating. The Western media are not reporting this news. This is causing great concern, as it is taking place while a dialogue is ongoing. The South Korean authorities are carrying out this kind of military provocation even as dialogue is being conducted. As members are aware, just last week there was a dialogue.

Yet the South Korean representative, at this meeting, took a confrontational approach in his remarks, failing to mention a single word about dialogue towards the settlement of the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula. Therefore, the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would like to urge the representative and the authorities of South Korea to remove the United States military bases from South Korea; they have been there for more than six decades, since 1945, dividing the country and creating a disastrous risk for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, its South Korean brothers and the entire Korean nation. We urge South Korea to remove the military bases of the United States, which are a haven for United States nuclear weapons.

As for Japan, the same applies. It is also under the nuclear umbrella of the United States. Furthermore, in 1960 the Japanese Government made a secret deal with the United States to allow American warships carrying nuclear weapons to enter the territorial waters of Japan. Since that time, it is everyday business for United States naval forces carrying nuclear weapons. It is up to them when they come and go, without providing any information at all. Furthermore, Japan is the largest weapons-grade plutonium accumulator in the world, to the tune of more than 40 tons, and it has the technology for nuclear weapons. It can assemble a nuclear weapon at short notice — within one week. This is known to every expert and every population in this world. It is an open secret.

Concerning means of delivery, it is also an open secret that the Japanese Government did not hesitate to engage in joint research and development in the area of missile defence with the United States, which it has been doing since 1999. Now it is reaching the stage of practical deployment in strategic positions, affecting the peace and stability of North-East Asia and the Asia-Pacific regions and the entire world.

**Mr. Rim Kap-soo** (Republic of Korea): I would like to exercise the Republic of Korea's right of reply in response to the North Korean delegation's claims, which clearly run counter to facts that have been recognized and supported by the international community.

Let me briefly chronicle what has happened since the year 1993. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea announced unilateral withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1993 and again in 2003. In 1993, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported the Democratic People's Republic's non-compliance with the safeguards agreement to the Security Council. The Democratic People's Republic conducted nuclear tests in 2006, just a year after the adoption of the 2005 Joint Statement. In April 2009, the Democratic People's Republic kicked the IAEA inspectors out of their country and, in May of the same year, they again conducted nuclear tests. Last year, they disclosed another nuclear programme for uranium enrichment.

The Security Council has adopted three resolutions, five presidential statements and one press statement on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea nuclear issue. Council resolution 825 (1993) was adopted in 1993 when the Democratic People's Republic announced its unilateral withdrawal. Resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) were adopted right after the Democratic People's Republic conducted nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009, respectively. In resolution 1874 (2009), the Security Council stated that it "[c]ondemns in the strongest terms the nuclear test" and decided that the Democratic People's Republic should abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes. Further, the Security Council called upon the Democratic People's Republic to act in strict accordance with its obligations under the NPT and IAEA safeguards.

Not only did the Security Council act, but the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six Parties clearly stated that the Democratic People's Republic undertook to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes. The Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference reaffirmed that fact and requested the Democratic People's Republic to return to the NPT and to compliance with the IAEA safeguards. Numerous violations detected by IAEA also confirm that fact, and further, the South-North Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, signed on 31 December 1991, clearly stipulated that North Korea should not produce uranium enrichment facilities.

The North Korean delegation is blatantly ignoring all of those obligations and now claims the right of peaceful use. With that right, the international community, including the United Nations and the IAEA, would, in their view, be ganging up in a grand conspiracy against the innocent North Korean authorities, but the North Korean authorities continue to confront and violate its international obligations. I believe that the North Korean position defies common sense.

Secondly, regarding national security, there have been a great many unprovoked provocations by North Korea. Of such provocations, I will give but some examples of those that were brought to and discussed at the United Nations. In 1983, bombs exploded and killed 17 high-level officials of the Republic of Korea, including our then-Foreign Minister, who were accompanying our President to Myanmar on a State visit. In 1987, a civilian Korea Air Lines flight exploded mid-air on the way home from abroad; all of the 115 people aboard were killed. In 1996, a North Korea submarine infiltrated our coastline with heavily armed military personnel, which led to a Security Council presidential statement (S/PRST/1996/42).

I will not elaborate any further on what happened last year — the Cheonan sinking and the Yeonpyeong shelling, which killed 50 people. Just last year, by my rough count, over 200 Korean people were killed or injured. Beside those physical provocations, the Democratic People's Republic has also mounted a great many verbal provocations. In 1994, a senior official of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea made the threatening remark that "Seoul is not far from the border. If war breaks out, Seoul will fall into the sea of fire". Those same remarks were repeated last year by a senior military general of the North Korean regime. Last December, North Korea's top military general declared that nuclear war is nearing and that all of South Korea will be engulfed in nuclear fire.

Now, my question is, once again, who is threatening? Who is living under a constant threat? Is it the North or the South? I will leave the answer to this question to the Assembly's common sense.

Lastly, after the signing of the South-North Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean

Peninsula in 1992, there has not been a single piece of news about any situation in that connection in South Korea. That is also a fact.

**Mr. Kodama** (Japan): I would like to exercise the right of reply to the allegations against Japan made by the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea at this meeting. Let me set the record straight on the following three points.

First of all, the Japanese Government's adherence to the three non-nuclear principles, namely that possessing, manufacturing or permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into the territory of Japan is prohibited, remains unchanged. Japan's determination to bring about the total elimination of nuclear weapons with a view to achieving a world without nuclear weapons is unshakeable. In that regard, indeed, there exist no facts supporting any claim that the Government of Japan has ever allowed the introduction of nuclear weapons by the United States on Japanese territories. Based on the United States nuclear policy expressed to date, such as the announcement in 1991, it is the judgment of the Government of Japan that there has currently been no introduction of nuclear weapons by the United States, including vessels and/or aircraft, to call at ports in, land on or transit through Japanese territories.

Secondly, Japan has strictly complied with its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards as a State party to the NPT. The peaceful nature of Japan's use of nuclear energy has been confirmed by the IAEA in its annual conclusion that all nuclear material remains within peaceful activities. Moreover, beyond its legal obligations, Japan has, as an international transparency measure, regularly reported the amount of its plutonium holdings in accordance with the guidelines for the management of plutonium, most recently on 29 September 2011.

Thirdly and finally, Japan maintains an exclusively defence-oriented policy. Therefore, exercises conducted by the Self-Defence Forces of Japan do not target any particular country or area. Moreover, the ballistic missile defence system which Japan has decided to introduce is purely defensive in nature and does not threaten any country or area neighbouring Japan.

**The Acting President**: I remind members that statements made in exercise of right of reply are limited to five minutes for the second intervention.

**Mr. Ri Tong Il** (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): Concerning the remarks by the representatives of the Republic of Korea and Japan, these representatives again made remarks that do not convey the fundamental realities on the Korean peninsula and in the vicinity, specifically in Japan. The representative of South Korea tells a different story by not referring to the nuclear umbrella that it has been using for over six decades, the world's largest nuclear-weapon nuclear umbrella. This is of the greatest concern to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, North-East Asia and the Asia-Pacific region. In the entire region there is not a single nuclear weapon threatening the sovereignty, dignity or national survival of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The only threat is the United States' nuclear umbrella, and South Korea is using that umbrella, though the representative did not refer to it.

Secondly, concerning the Security Council resolutions, as I said earlier, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea totally rejects them as reflecting no fundamental reality on the Korean peninsula. That fact undermines the mandate of the Security Council and the credibility of the United Nations Charter, which stipulates that every country has a sovereign right to defend itself. Self-defence is indeed at stake in the case of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which exists under South Korea's nuclear umbrella provided by the largest nuclear-weapon State.

Thirdly, concerning the so-called — according to what was said here earlier — terrorist attacks by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, it was the dictatorial regime of South Korea that was responsible. Every time there was a political crisis at that time the South Korean authorities made up a story, diverting the attention of the people of South Korea to accusations against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, so that the authorities could survive the political crisis.

It is the same with the current South Korean authorities. In the case of last year's Cheonan incident, as soon as they came to power the South Korean authorities stopped all the channels of reconciliation dialogue between the two sides, which were in place under and in line with the Joint Declaration of 15 June 2000, adopted at the summit meeting in Pyongyang,

which was followed by another summit meeting in 2007. But the South Korean authorities stopped that entire process, and now they are in a political crisis. So they fabricated the so-called Cheonan incident. And how many young soldiers did they kill? It was over 40. There is much profound scepticism about that incident, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea strongly insists that the ones responsible for that incident should be brought to justice. There is much scepticism about that incident. The so-called assessment survey results are less than convincing. There are many questions, even among the South Korean population. Experts living in the United States have themselves openly released their own arguments against the survey results.

In response to the delegate of Japan, Japan has once again made false remarks under the guise of so-called three non-nuclear principles. But fortunately, last year the Foreign Minister of Japan acknowledged the proven entry of United States nuclear weapons into the territorial waters of Japan, on the adoption of the secret nuclear deal in 1960. They never asked what was coming into their territorial waters. Also, Japan is now making a lot of territorial plans — on the Korean peninsula in Dokdo Island, on Chinese territory in the Diaoyu Islands and on Russian territory in the Kuril Islands. And one country is encouraging Japan to continue pressing those claims — and that is the United States.

**Mr. Rim Kap-soo** (Republic of Korea): Regarding the claims made by the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, I will be very brief. First, Seoul is just 55 miles away from the border and has a population of 12 million people. Along the border there are 1 million North Korean troops. They have made a great many provocations, as I indicated earlier. Without going into detail, there are over 24 cases. So we are constantly being threatened by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. I live in Seoul, so I know very well how difficult and dangerous it is to live in such a situation. So, if the Democratic People's Republic of Korea claims that they are facing a nuclear threat from the United States, Seoul is just 55 miles away from the hostile nuclear arms of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Secondly, last year our ship Cheonan was sunk, and 46 young soldiers died. Also, in November one of our islands was very heavily shelled, killing four people. There was no response to our complaints from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. They did not acknowledge or even refute any wrongdoing. But then, who did it? Did the "Phantom of the Opera" do it?

Thirdly, the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea mentioned our dictatorial regime in 1980 inventing fabrications. Allow me to advise his delegation that the dictatorial regime in the North should take care of its own people before making such allegations.

**Mr. Kodama** (Japan): I will be very brief. Whatever allegations the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea made in his second exercise of the right of reply, my delegation would like very much to remind the international community that it was the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that continued developing its nuclear and missile programmes, including its uranium enrichment programme, in violation of the relevant Security Council resolutions and of the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005 coming out of the Six-Party Talks.

It is imperative for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to take concrete steps to demonstrate its genuine commitment to complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization and to improving inter-Korean relations, in order to have meaningful dialogue among the six parties.

**The Acting President**: May I take it that it is the wish of the General Assembly to conclude its consideration of agenda item 86?

*It was so decided.*

*The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.*